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There can be no doubt that the last several years have been characterized by an unprecedented level of mobilization at the state level against reigning neoliberal development or-
thodoxy in South America.  This has taken a wide variety of forms, 
with moderate social-democratic left governments who respect ex-
isting institutional frameworks arising in Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Argentina and Chile, and more radical, populist governments tak-
ing power in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador.  The leaders of these 
latter three countries have used their popular mandates to institute 
greater societal changes, resting their legacies on new constitutions 
that would restructure the power balance of their society in impor-
tant ways.  Bolivia and Ecuador, the two countries considered by 
this study, are unique in their paths toward constitutional change, 
insofar as wide-ranging constitutional reforms have always been an 
integral demand of their powerful indigenous movements. 
One of the core demands for both movements was that of 
“plurinationality,” which served up an ambitious challenge to the 
Western liberal conceptions of the nation-state upon which the 
new Latin American democracies rested.  The plurinational state 
would reject the conception of the individual as the sole right-bear-
ing subject and a unitary, non-ethnic conception of national gov-
ernment.  A 1994 Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de 
Ecuador (CONAIE) document defined the plurinational state as: 
…a new political structure: administratively decentralized, 
culturally heterogeneous, and open to the direct and par-
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ticipatory representation of all indigenous nationalities and 
social sectors, particularly those that have been marginalized 
and excluded from the state structure and dominant socio-
economic development models. (Andolina 727)
In practical terms, it would institutionalize indigenous judicial and 
administrative practices outside of the state, guarantee indigenous 
participation in state agencies, allow ethnically-designated commu-
nities economic autonomy and control over national resources and 
land distribution, and foster a mixed economy based on the pro-
motion of local markets (729).  In contrast to the liberal model of 
the state, the plurinational ideal would recognize and make official 
the existence of different juridical and economic models within a 
single nation-state.  Albeit to differing degrees, both Bolivia and 
Ecuador’s new constitutions now declare the countries to be pluri-
national states. 
The rapid delegitimation of existing political institutions and 
party systems, as well as the history of indigenous organizing, al-
lowed for these two left-wing populist governments to take power 
and utilize constitutional assemblies as a means of inducing change 
in their societies.  The two cases provide an intriguing contrast in 
the relative success of indigenous actors in state politics over time. 
While the Ecuadorian federation CONAIE established itself as the 
most coherent indigenous organization in Latin America and was 
the progenitor of the Constitutional Assembly, its political fortunes 
faded over time.  They have come to oppose many of the initia-
tives of the Correa administration.  Their political arm, Pachakutik, 
has also become increasingly feeble in electoral terms, bringing in 
only 2.2 percent in the 2006 Ecuadorian elections, in contrast to 
the 53.7 percent landslide victory of the heavily-indigenous Mov-
imiento al Socialismo (MAS) party in Bolivia in 2005.  
How could such a dramatic reversal have occurred?  The con-
clusion of this paper is somewhat surprising: the Bolivian system 
was initially less open to contestation and the Bolivian indigenous 
movement was less willing to compromise with state actors than 
were their Ecuador counterparts, which actually led to a greater 
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level of long-term success for the Bolivian indigenous movement. 
When both political systems faced legitimacy crises, the fact that 
the Bolivian indigenous organizations had consistently stayed out-
side of the government allowed the Bolivians to credibly claim to 
represent not only their communities but also all those excluded by 
the neoliberal program.  In contrast, Ecuadorian indigenous orga-
nizations had participated as partners in the power structure; thus, 
when the Ecuadorians faced the reality of acting as minority part-
ners in a democratic party-system that had very little legitimacy 
among the population, the outsider status that had initially made 
CONAIE so attractive as an aggregator of social discontent with 
neoliberalism faded.  It gave way instead to a view of the indigenous 
movement as just another interest group in a corporatist regime 
seeking to advance its cause at the expense of the rest of the soci-
ety.  Indeed, one can see that the key reason that the fortunes of 
CONAIE and the Bolivian indigenous movements crossed has a 
great deal to do with the strategies they pursued regarding electoral 
politics—both the timing of their entrance into the electoral arena 
and the manner in which they decided to do so. 
As such, Bolivia and Ecuador show that a movement which 
is defined as being the most compromising or “pragmatic” is not 
always the most successful.  In societies in which the institutions 
are formally democratic but popularly discredited, the authenticity 
and “purity” that come from a systematic exclusion from the levers 
of power often serve as more powerful weapons than does the ac-
cess to those institutions.  The new constitutions produced in the 
two countries clearly demonstrate how quickly and successfully the 
Bolivian indigenous movement was able to move from exclusion to 
consolidated state power relative to the Ecuadorian movement. 
alternative hyPotheses anD eXistinG literature 
The phenomenon of indigenous mobilization supplanting 
more traditional forms of agitation based on social class and labor 
status has been discussed at length by a variety of authors.  While 
poverty and social exclusion among the indigenous population has 
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been a relative constant across both time and geographic boundar-
ies, the emergence of organizations explicitly making rights-based 
claims on the basis of their indigenous status is an entirely con-
temporary phenomenon and one that is not present everywhere. 
Deborah Yashar, in analyzing why indigenous movements arose in 
Ecuador and Bolivia but not in ethnically similar Peru, highlights 
the impact of neoliberal policies that challenged the political foun-
dations necessary for local community autonomy and discusses the 
importance of having political associational space and transcom-
munity networks in successful organizing (283).  The breakdown 
of mid-twentieth-century corporatist regimes that sheltered indig-
enous communities and assimilated them into the nationalist state 
repoliticized ethnic cleavages and led to a surge of political and cul-
tural activity based on indigenous identities. 
The work of Nancy Postero adds a level of complexity to Yas-
har’s analysis, suggesting that, particularly in Bolivia, processes of 
decentralization and the promotion of “multicultural citizenship” 
by the neoliberal state itself helped energize the indigenous move-
ment.  The fact that indigenous organizations were recognized as 
legitimate political actors at the municipal level did not change 
the fact that they remained marginalized from national decision-
making and economic power.  However, their partial inclusion 
did encourage the organizations to challenge the system beyond 
the boundaries of the local politics to which they were confined. 
They also challenged the limited notions of citizenship opened up 
by the programs of neoliberal multiculturalism (225).  Donna Lee 
Van Cott expands on the necessity of party system fragmentation 
or dealignment in addition to a permissive institutional environ-
ment, in considering the relative successes of ethnic-based parties. 
The most successful of these parties, the Ecuadorian Pachakutik 
and the Bolivian MAS, were also characterized by a willingness 
to make alliances with non-indigenous actors as part of a broader 
anti-neoliberal front (224).
The approach developed in this paper builds on the work of 
the writers who examined institutional change in these countries 
from the standpoint of indigenous mobilization and is applied to 
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Bolivia and Ecuador’s recently ratified constitutions.  However, not 
all analysts ascribe these constitutional processes to the democratic 
inadequacies of the liberal model and mobilizations of indigenous 
actors, and it is important to consider what is perhaps the most 
popularly held alternate explanation for the relative radicalism of 
the institutional reform projects in the two states.
This alternate view, supported by Kurt Weyland, argues that 
the crucial factor is: 
…the natural resource bonanza of recent years and the re-
sulting windfall gains accruing to Venezuela, Ecuador and 
Bolivia. These rents discredit the neoliberal insistences on 
constraints, suggest the availability of great opportunities, 
and thus stimulate radicalism and voluntarist attacks on the 
established socioeconomic and political order. (5)
According to this view, nations that have not experienced such 
windfalls have opted for more moderate center-left governments 
that have not sought to enact wide-spanning constitutional reform 
projects. 
The view of the paper is that this explanation is excessively 
reductionist and insufficient to justify developments in Bolivia 
and Ecuador.  The demand for a Constitutional Assembly in both 
countries was raised by movements hostile to neoliberalism since 
1990, before any commodity boom, and in both cases, the origi-
nal call was based not in a desire for nationalization and socialized 
corporatist economies, but for a recognition of land and territory 
rights—a demand which is historically far deeper and unrelated to 
global commodity prices or the discovery of resource deposits. 
The nationalist energy policies adopted by the Correa and 
Morales government are of course influenced greatly by the com-
modity boom; as Allyson Benton underscores, “all hydrocarbons-
producing nations have an incentive to find ways to increase state 
income from the sector to take advantage of rising earnings to in-
vestment ratios, regardless of policy preferences” (2).  In periods of 
low commodity prices, the tendency is to lower state investment 
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and raise incentives for private investors through permissive tax 
and royalty regimes, while high commodity prices produce political 
incentives to increase state control to generate maximum revenues. 
In this light, rational economic thinking, not unthinking radical-
ism, promotes state control during such periods and is not neces-
sarily correlated with constitutional reforms.
Furthermore, Weyland claims that “the collapse of party sys-
tems in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador did not precede the rise of 
radicals and populists—as a true cause would—but coincided with 
it” (12).  He interprets the Bolivian system of “pacted democracy” 
as a particularly strong system that managed to sustain agreements 
for market reforms beyond the expectations for the chronically un-
stable nation.  The ability of the political elites to find consensus, 
however, did not correlate with the social situation in the nation. 
As Wolff describes, the two nations had a “formally functioning 
but publicly delegitimized democracy” that promised representa-
tion, participation, and equality but instead delivered a policy con-
vergence around an increasingly unpopular neoliberal program (5). 
Five years before the election of Evo Morales, the national govern-
ment was unable to handle the massive civil conflict of the Coch-
abamba “Water War,” which was a broad-based anti-privatization 
struggle that had nothing to do with windfall natural gas profits 
and everything to do with skyrocketing prices of basic necessities 
and participants’ non-market conception of natural resources.  The 
MAS party had also nearly taken first place in the 2002 elections, 
running principally on a platform of defense of coca cultivation. 
There is also no reason to suggest, as Weyland, does that 
“people expected the country to turn into a rentier economy and 
receive enormous revenue streams” (26).  Firstly, antipathy to an 
extractivist economic model in both countries is quite high, partic-
ularly in the case of the Amazonian sectors of CONAIE, but also 
reflected more broadly within the Bolivian indigenous movement. 
While this conception of natural resources would be the cause for 
confrontation with the Correa regime in Ecuador, it has to be not-
ed that the impetus for constitutional change did not come from 
special interests expecting oil-based windfalls; instead, it was made 
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in terms of indigenous cultural autonomy and territory rights, 
which constitutes an entirely separate discourse.  Considering the 
Bolivian case further, the pervasive social mobilizations against the 
privatization of water and for land reforms in the tropical lowlands 
and indigenous autonomy do not fit into the interpretive schema of 
demands of a rentier economy.  Even as the partial nationalization 
of the natural gas industry has significantly raised national revenue 
and decreased foreign direct investment in its natural gas sector, 
the social programs announced by the Morales administration do 
not appear to be nearly on the scale of what “enormous revenue 
streams” would entail. 
What both the Correa and Morales administrations have 
sought is an increase in policy space for the government, counter 
to the expectations of international financial institutions.  Obvi-
ously, a resource boom facilitates greater policy experimentation in 
the economic realm because the governments have more money to 
work with.  However, as of yet, there is little proof that govern-
ments have overspent their budgets or promoted inflationary poli-
cies, and the states in question have in fact run budgetary surpluses. 
Overemphasizing the effects of national resource price fluctuations 
at the expense of political factors relating to particular phenomena 
of social mobilization and the instability of party systems presents 
an incomplete depiction of populist governments and constitu-
tional reforms.  It is impossible to simply extrapolate the content of 
these reforms merely from the countries’ energy policies, particu-
larly since the principal demands in question were developed and 
popularly promoted during periods of low commodity prices in the 
1990s.  This study asserts the importance of indigenous organizing 
and popular discontent with neoliberal party-systems as the key 
factors for their emergence. 
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eCuaDor – from unity to Demobilization
History of Indigenous Organizing and Political Success in the 
Ecuadorian Party-System
Within Ecuador in 1990, the newly-formed national indige-
nous federation CONAIE declared its demand for a Constitutional 
Assembly in a dramatic ten-day protest labeled the Levantamiento 
Nacional Indígena.  In this mobilization, where the movement par-
alyzed economic activity in the country, CONAIE called for a new 
constitution that would recognize Ecuador as a plurinational state, 
protect and recognize communally-held land titles, and challenge 
the natural-resource extractivist model that was leading to environ-
mental degradation in areas with indigenous populations.
After seeing their support in the population steadily increase 
and forming links with progressive non-indigenous organizations 
in urban areas, the Ecuadorian CONAIE, operating through their 
political party Pachakutik, decided to enter national politics in 
1996.  They joined an unstable political system suffering from ex-
treme multi-partyism and very low percentages of support from 
the population. For a time, they enjoyed great success in this con-
text and were, according to Wolff, “increasingly seen as not only 
promoting particular indigenous interests and values, but as rep-
resenting a new force leading an anti-neoliberal and anti-establish-
ment platform” (4).
The confederation’s social strength and organizing vitality 
stemmed from a specific form of politicization that Wolff calls a 
combination of a “negative macro-political focus with a positive 
pragmatist stance as to concrete micro-political claims” (3). Embed-
ded in the base territories of indigenous groups, the organization 
had a mandate not only to conduct politics over issues of national 
importance but also to show that it could concretely improve the 
lives of the constituencies it was representing in order to maintain 
their support.  Though at the national level, CONAIE’s political 
power and social credibility came from the rejection of unpopular 
governments, politicians, political practices, and politics, this defi-
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ant stance was compromised by the tantalizing possibilities that 
concrete government concessions promised.  As governments grew 
increasingly willing to negotiate with the indigenous groups—of-
fering management of development funds, local projects and mi-
croenterprises, and limited participation in national administra-
tion—conflicts and divisions between different organizations 
emerged, both inside and outside CONAIE.  Maintaining a purely 
negative macropolitical stance grew untenable, as their increased 
political power suggested the ability to get some of their immediate 
claims met.
This led Pachakutik to participate in coalitions as minority 
partners with other political actors, most prominently with Colo-
nel Lucio Gutiérrez and his Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP), 
which had organized on a nationalist platform opposing neoliberal 
economic reforms and dollarization.  The group participated in the 
PSP’s attempted rebellion against neoliberal president Jamil Ma-
huad in 2000, in which CONAIE president Antonio Vargas brief-
ly served on a one-day “Triumvirate of National Salvation” with 
Gutiérrez ( Jameson 16).  They eventually achieved national power 
as a partner of PSP after the election of Gutiérrez in 2003. 
With this event, indigenous politicians were granted cabinet 
positions for the first time, with Nina Pacari becoming Foreign 
Minister and later CONAIE president Luis Macas Minister of 
Agriculture.  Macas was optimistic about the possibilities opened 
by this move, declaring in the early days of 2003 that “Ushay is a 
Kichwa word that means power, which is to perfect living condi-
tions and the capacity to develop ourselves collectively…. The gov-
ernment can be another instance of continuing to build ushay” (17). 
However, as Miguel Carvajal presents it: 
…[I]n the midst of the triumph of the “new”—of the “military 
patriots” who played with the reinvention of the patria and 
of the “incorruptible, patient, and unbending Indians—very 
few people had calculated the torturous path that awaited the 
government alliance.” (5)
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In government, the indigenous ministers were able to push 
some small agenda items, particularly in the field of agriculture, 
but ultimately fell into the dilemma of what Yashar calls the “Her-
culean task”:  in a context in which they did not hold a majority, 
they were confronted with a choice between “working to deliver on 
some issues through legislative compromise, logrolling, and coali-
tion-building (potentially seeming to betray some of the ideals of 
the movement) or maintaining their ideological purity and hence 
seeming ineffective (because they cannot achieve concrete goals)” 
(Yashar 303).  The synthesis of micro- and macropolitics that made 
CONAIE an effective organization had begun to unravel, as they 
went to both extremes during their stint in office. 
By March 2003, with these indigenous ministers still in his ad-
ministration, a supposedly “left-wing nationalist” President Gutiér-
rez had made a friendly visit to the United States, proclaimed his 
support for a Free Trade Area of the Americas, signed a letter of 
intent with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and formed 
an alliance with the right-wing Social Christian Party (PSC).  The 
participation of the leadership in a government that was actively 
supporting the economic status quo against which CONAIE had 
organized enraged them and led to the resignation or removal of 
their ministers.  By July, the confederation had declared its opposi-
tion to the government.
CONAIE emerged from the experience extremely weakened. 
It was bad enough that it had shown faulty judgment in supporting 
and collaborating with Gutiérrez who, in addition to reneging on 
his populist promises, was fast developing a reputation for corrup-
tion.  It was worse that they had showed themselves to be entirely 
impotent in changing the direction of his policies from the oppo-
sition.  To preserve the stability of his power, Gutiérrez success-
fully fomented division within the indigenous movement, naming 
former CONAIE president Antonio Vargas the new Minister of 
Agriculture and obtaining the support of Federación Ecuatoriana 
de Indígenas Evangélicos (FEINE), a religious federation of indig-
enous groups separate from CONAIE.  In sharp contrast to a 1999 
poll that named CONAIE the third most trusted institution in the 
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country behind only the Church and the military (Yashar 303), a 
2003 poll showed that 58 percent of the population has “little or no 
confidence” in the movement (Lucero 146).
By 2005, the country was up in arms against the Gutiérrez 
presidency, but CONAIE was notably absent from the demonstra-
tions that would ultimately oust Gutiérrez in April.  A weakened 
CONAIE movement angrily decried the political system in which 
they had fared so badly.  Pachakutik then substantially disassoci-
ated itself from progressive urban and mestizo elements with which 
it had formerly worked, and it instead adopted a more ethnocentric 
discourse.
Even as the organization retreated into greater indigenism, it 
found itself unable to successfully rally its bases against the “traitor-
ous” government.  Buoyed by high oil prices and high levels of remit-
tances from Ecuadorians working abroad, Gutiérrez largely avoid-
ed the type of austerity programs that would galvanize indigenous 
dissent.  In addition, he managed to skillfully dispense economic 
patronage to neglected municipalities in an effort to undermine the 
support and to mobilize capacity of his former allies.  Although the 
indigenous movement’s prior organizing had likely led the govern-
ment to hold back on its structural adjustment agenda, the lack of 
such active policies contributed to CONAIE’s demobilization and 
partial cooptation (Wolff 10).
The 2006 elections that propelled Rafael Correa, a dissident 
finance minister with ties to the anti-Gutiérrez movement, into the 
presidency were characterized by a confluence of factors favoring a 
populist movement with a strong anti-systemic critique and cred-
ible claims to outsider status.  Correa’s candidacy catapulted ahead 
of that of his competitors when he declared that “in order not to 
legitimate the sewer that is the National Congress,” his Alianza 
PAIS party would not run any legislative candidates and would 
press all of its hopes on a Constitutional Assembly that would re-
place the governing functions of a hopelessly corrupt party system. 
This Assembly would, according to Conaghan, both “cleanse the 
body politic of its dysfunctional institutions and at the same time 
mark a definitive break with neoliberalism,” thereby reconstituting 
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the state’s central role in the economy (Conaghan 4).  Freidenberg 
argues that Ecuador has always been characterized by extreme in-
stitutional fragmentation and extremely low confidence in politi-
cal parties, which has led to the emergence of outsider candidates. 
However, Correa’s total refusal to negotiate with either existing 
parties or institutions and a clearly enunciated nationalist program 
stood in stark contrast with Gutiérrez’s electoral cynicism and led 
to great popular support.
Although we have seen that the idea of a Constitutional As-
sembly restructuring Ecuador is an idea presented by CONAIE 
16 years before Correa’s election, the indigenous movement did 
not form a part of Correa’s coalition, preferring to run Macas on 
a Pachakutik-only line.  A year after the landslide victory of the 
indigenous Morales in Bolivia, CONAIE, supposedly the stron-
gest and most regionally-consolidated indigenous movement in 
Latin America, achieved its most dismal showing ever, with a sixth 
place finish of less than three percent.  The major surprise of the 
election was that Gilmer Gutiérrez, brother of the disgraced for-
mer president, garnered a third-place finish with 17 percent due to 
heavy support from the indigenous and rural poor.  CONAIE was 
unable to compel its constituency to vote for its own candidates, 
many of whom had retained fondness for the Gutiérrez govern-
ment.  The Correa administration did not appoint any indigenous 
ministers, nor did they list many indigenous collaborators for their 
Government Plan.  Thus, at the very moment in which the neo-
liberal policies against which they had struggled for decades were 
being seriously contested, ironically through the means (Constitu-
tional Assembly) that they themselves had demanded, CONAIE 
was sidelined from the action.
The entire electoral experience of Pachakutik, but particularly 
their ill-fated flirtation with Gutiérrez, tied the popular perception 
of the indigenous movement to the old party-system against which 
Alianza PAIS was railing.  Due to the fact that they had negotiated 
and signed pacts with corrupt political parties and held cabinet-lev-
el positions under an extremely unpopular president only several 
years prior, any kind of anti-systematic position they could take 
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was incredible to the general population.  CONAIE’s weakened 
state would have repercussions in the Constitutional Assembly and 
the actual text it produced. 
Implications for Constitutional Change
In the Constitutional Assembly, according to Jameson, there 
were important overlaps between the policy initiatives of the Correa 
administration and the demands of CONAIE, but also significant 
disjunctures.  The targets against which Correa defined himself 
were also the enemies of CONAIE: multinational financial institu-
tions like the World Bank and the IMF, owners of Ecuadorian sov-
ereign debt, the private sector in control of the oil industry, strong 
regional economic interests such as those centered in Guayaquil, 
the national Congress, and free-trade advocates ( Jameson 10). 
However, while Correa’s major preoccupation was strengthening 
the central state in order to obtain more policy space for economic 
initiatives outside the neoliberal framework, CONAIE attacked 
the state and called for the devolution of power and resources to 
indigenous communities and organizations, and for a regime of in-
digenous autonomy that would transcend the cultural realm and 
promote economic self-determination.
When CONAIE first entered the Constitutional Assembly, 
Pachakutik assembly-members allied themselves with Correa and 
his Acuerdo País representatives.  They spoke very highly of the 
President of the Assembly Alberto Acosta who, “unlike many in 
the government, came from a tradition of accompaniment of the 
indigenous movement, of the workers, the ecologists, the feminists, 
of all the movements that were for an alternative society” (Rhon 
qtd. in Vogel).  Pachakutik Assembly Member Monica Chuji re-
ferred to the Correa government in April 2008 as a regime that 
“seeks to overcome the long night of neoliberalism, seeks to recover 
the historical demands of all the social sectors of the indigenous, 
the afros, the peasants, etc.” (qtd. in Vogel).  The governing coali-
tion declared itself to be in favor of plurinationality, one of the core 
CONAIE demands, and CONAIE became a strong supporter of 
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the constitutional process.  On March 11, 2008, they organized a 
demonstration of 25,000 of its members in Quito in support of 
plurinationality and the assembly and claimed that they served as a 
much-needed mass base to a Correa administration that had risen 
to power without institutional connections to social movements. 
The honeymoon between CONAIE and Correa would prove 
to be short, however.  Although the constitutional text approved 
by the Assembly included the juridical concept of plurinationality, 
CONAIE had been pushing for “prior consent” of communities be-
fore any kind of economic exploration of their territories would be 
legal.  This was out of line with Correa’s nationalist economic pro-
gram, which, while critical of multinational corporations, sought 
to fund government programs with the country’s oil wealth, which 
constitutes 40 percent of the state’s revenue.
 Thus, Article 57 of the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution, 
which details the “collective rights” of indigenous “communi-
ties, peoples, and nationalities,” includes:
4. The conservation of the unproscribable property of their 
community lands, which will be inalienable, unseizable, and 
indivisible. These lands will be exempt from the payment of 
taxes.
5. Maintenance of the possession of ancestral lands and ter-
ritories.
6. Participation in the use, usufruct, administration and con-
servation of the renewable natural resources that are found in 
their lands.
7. A prior consultation, free and informed, within a reason-
able time-frame, regarding plans and programs of prospect-
ing, exploitation and commercialization of non-renewable 
resources that are found in their lands and which could af-
fect them environmentally or culturally…If the consent of 
the community consulted is not obtained, it will proceed in 
conformance with the Constitution and the law.
Although this recognizes the validity of indigenous collective land-
holdings, it calls only for a consultation regarding any kind of ex-
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tractive enterprise on indigenous lands, and, by providing for the 
possibility of resource exploitation in the absence of consent, does 
not actually require that the state respect the outcomes of this con-
sultation.  It also grants the indigenous groups the right to “partici-
pation” in the use of their renewable resources, but does not neces-
sary grant them sole dominion over them. 
One of their key demands having not been met, CONAIE 
adopted a position of support for the Constitution mixed with 
criticism of the government. As Monica Chuji explained in a No-
vember 2008 interview, “[in regards to plurinationality] the new 
constitution, albeit in a limited manner, reflects a lot of the people’s 
aspirations.  It is the product of a collective force.  [However], I 
began to see a continuation of the same old line and of the extrac-
tivist model.  There was no change on this issue” (qtd. in Vogel). 
By mid-November 2008, CONAIE was back in the opposition, 
rallying thousands of people across Ecuador in protest of the po-
tentially environmentally disastrous repercussions of a new mining 
law passed by the Correa administration and of a water law which 
they claimed could lead to privatization.  The mining law increased 
government control over the sector and put stricter environmental 
safeguards on operations, but fell short of the total ban on open-cut 
mining and prior consent that the confederation had been seeking. 
The conflict between developmentalism and environmental-
ism/indigenous protection in the Correa administration is exem-
plified by the Yasuní-Ishpingo Tambacocha Tipituni (ITT) Initia-
tive. In this encounter, the Ecuadorian government proposed to 
refrain from oil exploration in an ecologically sensitive area popu-
lated by the “voluntarily isolated” Tagaeri and Taromenane peoples 
in exchange for subsidies from the international community, which 
would total approximately half the projected revenue of the oil ex-
traction.  While environmentalist and indigenous groups initially 
lauded this Correa initiative, it is now clear that financing such a 
project—which required an initial international down payment of 
$350 million—is quite difficult.  Despite ongoing talks with the 
governments of countries such as Germany and Hungary, Correa 
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declared in February 2009 that “I will not permit that 900 million 
barrels of oil remain underground, that we become like beggars 
seated on top of a sack of gold, because the international commu-
nity is all talk” (Globovision 2009).  The president further declared 
that if the necessary funds were not raised by June, he would either 
ask Congress or declare a public referendum on the issue of oil ex-
ploration in the area, regardless of the desires of the indigenous 
groups living in the territory.
Issues such as these have led to an increasingly acrimonious 
war of words between Correa and CONAIE leaders, with the pres-
ident calling their opposition “infantile” and “fundamentalist” and 
claiming that it was “absurd to be seated on hundreds of billions of 
dollars and for romantic notions, novelty, fixations or whatever, to 
say no to mining” (qtd. in Moore).  He accused the movement of 
having “lost its compass, playing a game with the right-wing sec-
tors which they had historically criticized, and which the current 
government is combating” (qtd. in “Correa”).  In response, while 
underlining his support for the Constitution, Marion Santi, the 
new president of the confederation emphasized that the indig-
enous movement has learned from its experience with Gutiérrez 
and would make no more alliances with the government (Denvir). 
It remains to be seen whether CONAIE will be able to mobilize 
successfully in response to his administration, given the high levels 
of public support the President enjoys and his striking victory in 
the constitutional referendum.
bolivia – from Protests to ProPosals
History of Indigenous Organizing and Claims-Making
In the Bolivian case, the demand for a constitutional assembly 
was first made in 1990 by the Central de Pueblos Indígenas del 
Beni (CPIB), a regional affiliate of the Confederación de Pueblos 
Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB), the major organization of indig-
enous peoples in the Bolivian lowlands.  After failing to protect 
their ancestral territory against encroachment from both large-
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scale agrobusiness and small-scale coca cultivators from the An-
dean highlands, the group decided to undertake a dramatic 650 
kilometer march to the national capital of La Paz in which they 
presented their demands for land titling before President Jaime Paz 
Zamora (Yashar 213).
According to Pedro Nuni, the current vice-president of CI-
DOB, the lowland indigenous movements understood that the 
current Constitution was inadequate for a permanent resolution of 
the question of indigenous autonomy and rights to territory, which 
would require unprecedented new legal norms for land use.  The 
movement called for a plurinational state with collective rights and 
recognition for all the native peoples of the country (Nuni).  Start-
ing with the 2000 conflict over water privatization in the city of 
Cochabamba and ending with the 2003 mobilizations over natu-
ral gas exports that led to the renouncement of President Gon-
zalo Sánchez de Losada, this call eventually developed a national 
character and was adopted by a heterogeneous assortment of so-
cial movements without an explicitly indigenous character.  These 
mobilizations would form the principal basis for President Evo 
Morales’s MAS political movement, led principally by Quechua-
speaking migrant coca farmers from the Chapare region.  Accord-
ing to Yashar, this “second-generation movement,” which had the 
participation of many who organized around a Marxist class basis 
in the mining industry, adopted a more indigenist rhetoric upon 
seeing the success of the ethnic-based claims of the Andean Ka-
tarista movement and of the Amazonian CIDOB (Yashar 18).
 The political party system in which such claims developed 
differed dramatically from that of the radical multi-partyism prev-
alent in Ecuador.  In the 1990s, Bolivia was said to have an ex-
tremely (even surprisingly) stable party system known as “pacted 
democracy,” in which power was primarily shared between three 
parties.  These were the Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) 
of former dictator Hugo Banzer, the Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario (MNR) of Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada, architect 
of Bolivia’s 1985 neoliberal reforms, and the Movimiento de la Iz-
quierda Revolucionaria (MIR) of Jaime Paz Zamora, a former dis-
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sident against the Banzer dictatorship who had since made amends 
with the dictator.  After the emergence of democracy in the 1980s, 
it became clear that no political party would come close to winning 
a majority of the popular vote.  Whereas in Ecuador this would 
lead to a runoff election between the two frontrunners, in Bolivia 
the President was selected by the Bolivian Congress, leading to co-
alition governments in which sometimes the second or even third 
place finisher would assume the presidency. 
Pacted democracy was praised by political scientists for en-
couraging power-sharing between different factions in a democratic 
consensus and bringing institutional stability to a country known 
for chaos and conflict.  However, that the political parties were able 
to reach agreements amongst themselves in the Congress turned 
out to be an illusory stability increasingly out of touch with the 
social situation in the country.  Van Cott adds that the restrictions 
on entry that pacted democracy generated:
…sustained a relatively homogenous political class with low 
levels of ideological and programmatic differentiation, result-
ing in an increasing emphasis on personalities and personal 
relationships and a decline in political meaning apart from 
professional advancement (159). 
This led to what Alenda calls an “intrinsic weakness in the govern-
ments since 1985, in their incapacity of achieving the consensus for 
the application of structural reforms or responding to the demands 
of society maintaining the ‘dynamic equilibrium’ which is the base 
of any governability” (9).  She justifies this view by pointing to six 
states of siege declared by various presidents from 1985 to 2000, 
mostly in response to labor union or miner mobilizations. 
By the time of the Banzer administration (1997- 2001), social 
discontent with the government was obvious.  Increasing social in-
stability was evidenced by violent conflicts with the cocalero unions 
in the Chapare and the so-called “Water War” of Cochabamba, 
in which the government unsuccessfully exercised repression on a 
wide variety of social movements protesting (successfully) against 
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the privatization of water in the city.  By 2001, poll results sug-
gested that Bolivia was the most critical country in Latin America 
regarding the exercise of democracy in their country, with many 
favoring its disappearance and almost half of the population believ-
ing that parties were not necessary for democracy (Alenda 10; Ma-
drid 492).  While the crucial moment of rupture with this system 
was yet to arrive, clearly any appearance of political party stability 
was deeply misleading. 
The response of Bolivia’s fragmented indigenous movement 
to this political climate varied widely.  The lowland CIDOB be-
came the darling of the international community, marketing itself 
successfully to international organizations by astutely receiving sig-
nificant foreign aid and combining their indigenous rights’ agenda 
with an environmental preservation argument for the Amazon. 
Although it had once made overtures to join with the numerical-
ly-larger highland Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores 
Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) in the 1980s, by the 1990s it 
was concerned with maintaining an independent stance.  As Lucero 
argues, CIDOB was not only “more ‘green’ but less ‘red’” than the 
CSUTCB, which persisted in a radical, anti-imperialist posture, 
did not seek aid abroad, and had very limited cooperation with the 
government; meanwhile the cocalero unions principally functioned 
as outlaws who were periodically subject to government crack-
downs (152).  In this environment, the incentives for CIDOB were 
to maintain a more moderate, accomodationist stance towards the 
central government. 
Reasons for the attitude taken by CIDOB are presented in a 
sociological encyclopedia of Bolivian social movements written by 
current Vice President Álvaro García Linera.  First, the 1953 land 
reform undertaken by the MNR revolutionaries affected primarily 
the western highlands and broke the oligarchic hacienda system of 
land tenure for the highland Quechua and Aymara.  Its provisions 
were never applied to the lowlands, where the old system of land 
tenure persisted with fewer changes and lands were sold off in large 
quantities to foreign immigrants and businessmen.  As such, the 
primary enemy for CIDOB became the local landowning interests 
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of the lowland provinces, primarily in Santa Cruz and Beni.  Given 
their numerical weakness vis-à-vis non-indigenous inhabitants of 
the lowlands, they tended to appeal to the central government as 
a potential ally against these landowners.  Their appeals to state 
power were partially vindicated in responses such as the 1996 pas-
sage of the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA) Law, 
which was a land reform that sought to regularize and redistribute 
landholdings in the lowlands and recognize indigenous “Commu-
nity Lands of Origin” in which they could exercise considerable au-
tonomy (García Linera 245). 
Unlike western indigenous groups—which were subject to 
selective repression by central government authorities during the 
Barrientos and Banzer dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s—and 
the cocaleros—who have aggressively been targeted by the Boliv-
ian state’s implementation of U.S.-backed coca eradication pro-
grams—the lowland indigenous groups do not have a history of 
violence with representatives of the Bolivian state.  Far from the 
political power of La Paz and in many cases geographically remote, 
the state neglected both their development and their political in-
corporation before the mid-twentieth century.  Even when the state 
enacted policies favoring landowners in the tropics, it was always 
the landowners themselves who were the face of domination in the 
region, not the central authorities.
CIDOB was thus unique in not adopting an oppositional dis-
course towards the central government, arguing instead that its role 
was to help the government resolve problems and enforce its laws, 
particularly those favorable to indigenous interests.  Gains were 
discursively presented not as conquests, but as examples of a good 
government pushed to do well and broadening its base of legiti-
macy (248).  In exchange for this attitude, they were rewarded am-
ply: CIDOB president Marcial Fabricano became Vice-Minister of 
Indigenous Affairs under the second Sánchez de Lozada admin-
istration.  However, while it “seduced a sector of the political elite 
and the public ready to entertain a multi-ethnic vision of Bolivian 
society,” CIDOB was not able to garner electoral power (Van Cott 
168).  Its attempts to run indigenous candidates led to returns of 
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less than four percent and a failure to elect a single representative. 
The accomodationist perspective in the western highlands 
was represented by the Kataristas, led by the Movimiento Revolu-
cionario Tupak Katari de Liberación (MRTKL) and former Vice 
President Victor Hugo Cárdenas.  This movement arose in the de-
sire of Aymara intellectuals to work in the interstices of ethnicity 
and class and was initially heavily tied to the CSUTCB.  While 
the MRTKL created the foundation of the ideological base from 
which more radical movements such as the MAS would feed, some 
Kataristas took a turn towards mainstream politics, allying with 
the MNR in 1993 and gaining the vice presidency after helping 
the right-wing Sánchez de Losada gain a plurality of the vote.  Al-
though on its own the Katarista could not garner much more than 
two percent of the electorate, they were widely credited with en-
abling the MNR’s victory.
While Cárdenas successfully advocated for various reform 
measures undertaken during his administration, most notably the 
Law of Popular Participation and the INRA Land Reform, he did 
so by participating in an administration that furthered the priva-
tization process with the “capitalization” of public companies, an 
agenda opposed by much of the indigenous movement at the time. 
As the government advanced policies opposed by CSUTCB and 
other groups occupying the political left, Cárdenas was perceived 
as out of touch with the indigenous masses, serving primarily as 
a figurehead, and the Kataristas never developed into an autono-
mous electoral force. 
While CIDOB and the Kataristas showed moderate ten-
dencies and maintained a good international image, the pacted 
democracy was crumbling rapidly.  Discontent with the Banzer 
administration, the success of the anti-privatization forces in the 
Cochabamba water conflict, coupled with an untimely intervention 
by the US ambassador, led to a meteoric rise in support for Evo 
Morales and MAS, which narrowly finished second to Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada in the 2002 elections with 20.9 percent of the 
vote.  The three main parties of pacted democracy saw their vote-
share slip to a mere 40 percent (Alenda 15).
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MAS differed dramatically from any other political party. 
Growing out of the Asamblea Soberana de los Pueblos, a militant 
confederation of coca growers who were fighting coca eradication, 
they organized to govern their own municipalities under the decen-
tralization of the Law of Popular Participation.  Organizing as a 
social movement and not as a top-down political party, MAS began 
to reach out to highland indigenous groups and become a dominant 
force in the CSUTCB, seeking to aggregate both Quechua and Ay-
mara speakers under the leadership of the half-Quechua, half-Ay-
mara Morales. From the original reference point of coca cultivation, 
it began to amass a variety of unfulfilled social demands.  Unlike 
other parties, MAS maintained a position of militant opposition, 
not only refusing to cooperate with any of the old parties, but also 
actively blocking the implementation of their policies and seeking 
to topple the foundations of their legitimacy.  They developed char-
acteristics that Raul Madrid calls “ethnopopulist”: instead of using 
exclusionary rhetoric and platforms to mobilize members of a par-
ticular ethnic group, they sought to appeal to a variety of marginal-
ized identities.
The total inability of Sánchez de Losada’s second adminis-
tration to govern in 2003 made clear what was developing during 
Banzer’s presidency: the system of pacted democracy was no lon-
ger sustainable and was ripe to be wiped away by a movement that 
could capture mass popular discontent.  As the 2003 government 
took up unpopular tax hikes—mandated by the IMF to decrease 
Bolivia’s deficit—and sought to export natural gas at preferential 
rates through Chile, the country’s historic enemy, this powerful 
new “ethnopopulist” movement arose around Evo Morales and the 
MAS. 
In February 2003, battles between an elite police unit and 
the army left several dead in one of the main squares of La Paz. 
By October 2003, total mayhem emerged in the streets.  A broad 
coalition of social movements led by the more radical elements of 
the indigenous movements, the CSUTCB of Felipe Quispe and 
the politicized neighborhood federations of the capital’s poor sis-
ter-city El Alto, blocked all routes into the city.  In the conflict to re-
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open the routes, more than 80 people were killed and cities all over 
Bolivia were shut down as people called for Sánchez de Losada’s 
resignation.  Unable to govern the country despite the support of 
all the old political forces, the president submitted his resignation 
and fled to the United States. 
Thus, between 2003 and 2005, all the elements that were pre-
viously viewed as “antiquated” and “obstructionist” rose to promi-
nence in the context of a general discrediting of the existing politi-
cal regime.  At that time, 95 percent of the population believed that 
democracy had not brought them any economic benefit (Lucero 
156).  The 2005 election that brought Evo Morales to office was 
characterized by the absolute collapse and discrediting of the three 
major parties, with the MIR virtually disappearing, the MNR 
garnering 6.5 percent of the vote, and the ADN having to recon-
stitute itself under the new name of Poder Democrático y Social 
(PODEMOS), which finished with a solid 28.6 percent.  MAS, 
on the other hand, was able to run as the only organized large-scale 
political force which had not participated in any prior government, 
and had a solid record of protesting them at every step.  To ce-
ment its support, MAS was careful to maintain an inclusive ethnic 
rhetoric, complementing the indigenous Morales with a non-in-
digenous vice presidential nominee and speaking in traditionally 
populist terms as they made anti-establishment claims, promised 
to use the national state for redistributive and interventionist aims, 
and relied on the significant personal appeal of Morales (Madrid 
491).  In such a way, they were able to garner the support of 71.1 
percent of self-identified indigenous and 63.6 percent of self-iden-
tified mestizos who spoke an indigenous language, along with siz-
able minorities of the white middle classes.  Ironically, it was the 
very systematic exclusion of these more radical movements from 
decision-making in the past that led to their credibility and popu-
larity in 2005.  As in Ecuador, a Constitutional Assembly was to be 
MAS’ aim as well. However in Bolivia, the indigenous movement 
would be the guiding motor for its realization.
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Implications for Constitutional Reform
Historical divisions between lowland and highland Bolivian 
indigenous groups notwithstanding, most major organizations in 
the country expressed support for and campaigned for the con-
stitution.  Both rhetorically and juridically, the indigenous rights 
language in the Bolivian constitutional project is far stronger than 
in its Ecuadorian counterpart.  The prologue of the Bolivian con-
stitution offers a striking indigenist paean to Bolivia’s multicultural 
and indigenous composition and the popular struggles of the last 
several decades:
The Bolivian people, of plural composition, from the depths 
of history, inspired in the struggles of the past, in the indig-
enous anticolonial uprising, in independence, in the popular 
liberation struggles, in the indigenous, social and unionist 
marches, in the water wars and those of October [about gas], 
in the struggles for land and territory, and with the memory 
of our martyrs, construct a new State….
We leave behind the colonial, republican, neoliberal State. We 
assume the historical challenge of collectively constructing a 
Social Unitary State of Plurinational Communitarian Law, 
which integrates and articulates the purposes of advancing 
towards a democratic, productive, and peacefully inspired 
Bolivia, committed with the development and free determi-
nation of its peoples.
This prologue is consonant with MAS’s ethnopopulist rhetoric, 
which is simultaneously indigenist and inclusionary.  It celebrates 
the indigenous majority in historically unprecedented ways while 
inviting non-indigenous populations to participate in the construc-
tion of the new state and refraining from claims that the indigenous 
experience represents the totality of the Bolivian experience. 
The current Bolivian vice president, Álvaro García Linera, 
was one of the key ideological architects of the constitution and the 
63Journal of Politics & Society
concept of plurinationality.  He maintained that the prior Bolivian 
model, based on principles of Western liberalism, was a monocul-
tural, Spanish-speaking, non-indigenous state that had been su-
perimposed on a plurinational society.  While it made claims to 
universality and equal representation, it could not help but rein-
force an exclusionary and racist society, for the supposedly “univer-
sal” institutions and values which existed at the national level were 
in fact all Western in origin.  Furthermore, he maintained, such 
a state represented only those who were integrated into the mod-
ern, capitalist mercantile sectors of the economy, leading to a “dis-
encounter between state life and the socioeconomic composition 
of the country” and a state that was “permanently under suspicion” 
and thus weak (Garcia Linera 55).  Thus, transforming a multilin-
gual, multicivilizational institutionality into a stronger state-form 
would require “demonopolizing the ethnicity of the state, permit-
ting dominanted and excluded ethnicities to share in the structures 
of social recognition and political power” (66).  Such a state would 
be consonant and organic with its actual social composition.
 In terms of content, the Bolivian Constitution goes far be-
yond any other national precedent in inscribing indigenous rights. 
Article 5 declares not only Quechua and Aymara but also 36 
other indigenous languages to be official alongside Spanish, and 
mandates that the “plurinational Government” and departmental 
governments use at least two official languages: Spanish and the 
indigenous language most appropriate for the community they 
are working with.  Indigenous nations are recognized as viable col-
lective entities regardless of existing municipal or departmental 
boundaries and are accorded a great degree of autonomy.
The chapter on “Indigenous Peasant Originator Autonomy” 
outlines this autonomous regime.  Article 289 states that “Indig-
enous-peasant-originator autonomy consists in self-government as 
an exercise of the free determination of the nations and indigenous 
peoples, whose population has their own territory, culture, history, 
languages, and organization or legal, political, social and economic 
institutions.”  In addition to guarantees of community justice norms 
and cultural development, one of the strongest articles that guaran-
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tees their rights to territory is Article 403:
The integrity of indigenous territory is recognized, which in-
cludes the right to the land, to the exclusive use of renewable 
natural resources in the conditions determined by the law, to 
a prior and informed consultation and the participation in 
the benefits resulting from the exploitation of non-renewable 
natural resources that are found in their territories; the ability 
to apply their own norms, administrated by their structures 
of representation and the definition of their development in 
accordance with their cultural criteria and principles of har-
monious coexistence with nature. 
The principal difference between this and the Ecuadorian model 
is that here, communities would have the exclusive right to any re-
newable natural resources on their land and not merely the right to 
“participation.”  However, in regards to non-renewable resources, 
principally hydrocarbons and natural gas, the state is still the main 
actor, as other articles of the Constitution mandate that hydrocar-
bons are the “inalienable property of the Bolivian people” and pro-
hibit any private entities, domestic or foreign, from acquiring them 
as property. 
There are several reasons why the Bolivian indigenous move-
ment accepted state ownership of natural resources while the Ecua-
dorians opposed it.  A degree of a highland, Quechua-Aymara bias 
exists in MAS, while most of the hydrocarbons in question are lo-
cated in the lowlands, where the indigenous groups were organized 
with CIDOB.  However, the lowland groups, while not directly 
articulated via MAS, also supported the new constitutional draft 
because it implied a generous recognition of their territorial juris-
dictions and extended rights over other resources in their territory. 
ConClusions
This study has demonstrated that, despite the strength and 
unity of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement in the 1990s vis-à-
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vis its Bolivian counterpart, CONAIE suffered a diminished politi-
cal capacity in the constitution produced by the Ecuadorian Con-
stitutional Assembly as compared to that of Bolivia.  The strongest 
movements in Bolivia now exercising state power are those that 
were systematically excluded from the political system in the 1990s. 
During that time they were believed to have an unreasonably con-
flictive and antiquated position marked by low levels of interna-
tional support, with the dominant cocalero faction of the Bolivian 
government even labeled as “terrorists” and “drug traffickers.”  In 
Ecuador, however, the CONAIE party lost its political clout in the 
Constitutional Assembly due to its previously pragmatic stance. 
This outcome challenges typical assumptions that movements that 
are more compromising will achieve greater electoral and political 
success.  It is precisely those movements that decided to enter their 
respective political realms during the neoliberal period, CONAIE/
Pachakutik in Ecuador and CIDOB/the Kataristas in Bolivia, that 
find themselves in a significantly weakened position today.  When 
the Bolivian state and international development organizations 
picked the indigenous actors with whom they wanted to work, they 
unwittingly empowered the “radical” movements that had emerged 
during the “water” and “gas” wars to become the dominant and al-
most politically hegemonic force in the country.  An examination of 
the increasing politicization of social conflicts by these movements 
makes clear that in times of rapid systemic delegitimation, radical-
ism wins credibility.
Pachakutik misinterpreted the Gutiérrez candidacy as the 
“populist moment” it had been waiting for and, because of that, 
was too quick to form an alliance with a candidate who did not 
seriously strive to transform the political system consonant with its 
demands.  The party did not have a correct reading of the political 
situation and its policies did not reflect the complete lack of legiti-
macy with which the Ecuadorian population considered their na-
tional government.  This led to a loss of credibility,and it weakened 
and divided Pachakutik just at the time that the party’s political 
project could have come to fruition; Correa capitalized on Pacha-
kutik’s demands and ran an anti-systemic campaign at precisely the 
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time when Pachajutik could have won.  While it can still continue 
to protest Correa’s ideas on resource extraction, and there is some 
evidence of increased mobilizational capacity in recent months, it 
is doubtful that Pachakutik has anything to gain from an oppo-
sitional stance towards a stable left-populist government.  There 
are numerous reasons why MAS was able to maintain a longer-
standing and more credible oppositional stance towards the Boliv-
ian government than did Pachakutik in Ecuador.  The first was the 
intransigence of the Banzer and Sánchez de Losada governments 
regarding the issue of coca eradication. The willingness of the state 
apparatus to use repression instead of negotiation against mostly 
nonviolent farmers led to both an impossibility of compromise and 
a vindication of their purely negative position.  In addition to this 
seemingly irreconcilable conflict, the second Sánchez de Losada 
government also refused to negotiate with the demands of the in-
creasingly powerful social movements, believing that it could push 
through its unpopular gas export plan through aggressive police 
action.  The Bolivian state, despite the supposed political consen-
sus of its pacted democracy, did not prove skillful at the divide and 
conquer tactics that successfully demobilized CONAIE.  Instead, 
it minimized any chance of cooptation and virtually guaranteed in-
digenous unity, as groups like CIDOB that did not actively partici-
pate in the opposition were forced either to change their position 
or to become politically irrelevant.  In an atmosphere of continued 
repression, the pressures to pursue a micropolitical project and 
compromise with the existing system in exchange for economic as-
sistance were far less than in Ecuador.  In Bolivia, the bases of the 
movements were more likely to accept an unambiguously “negative” 
program when the government was pursuing the destruction of 
their economic livelihoods and continuing repression. 
These findings also suggest that class-based movements have 
not entirely surrendered the mantle to those organizing on the ba-
sis of indigeneity.  The most successful movements were syncre-
tistic, mixing ethnic and traditional leftist class appeal.  Stemming 
from the strong presence of communists in the Bolivian miners’ 
movement, the Marxist influence on the discourse of the cocalero or 
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CSUTCB leaders was key to integrating many of those who were 
discontented with neoliberal reforms.  Inclusionary populist move-
ments with urban support like the MAS have successfully institu-
tionalized indigenous demands, whereas movements with a solely 
ethnic identification have floundered.  The story in these two Latin 
American cases is not as simple as the triumph of identity politics 
over social class frequently assumed to have taken place in the turn 
to the postmodern.  While the traditional left may have needed to 
adopt the discourse of indigenous rights to remain relevant in the 
Andes, the indigenous groups have had to borrow quite a bit from 
the traditional left to be successful.
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